Shelter America Corporation v. Ohio Casualty and Insurance : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1986
Shelter America Corporation v. Ohio Casualty and
Insurance : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John A. Beckstead; John H. Rees; Callister, Duncan and Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellant.
Raymond M. Berry; John R. Lund; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Shelter America Corporation v. Ohio Casualty & Insurance, No. 860174 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/68
U I AM WrUUK I V r A r f C A L d 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
A10 
DOCKET NO. ^(cOn-4-CJ^ 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHELTER AMERICA CORPORATION, a 
Colorado corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
Case No. 86-0174-CA 
OHIO CASUALTY & INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, 
Defendant-Cross 
Appellant/Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 860104 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT/RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
John A. Beckstead (A0263) 
John H. Rees (A4031) 
Suite 800 
Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Shelter America 
Corporation 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Raymond Berry (A0310) 
John R. Lund (A4368) 
Attorneys for Cross Appellants/ 
Respondent Ohio Casualty & 
Insurance Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
<-»r>rj 
I OCT 2 0 1987 
r.n\ mi OF APPEALS 
THE COURT OF APPEALS 
F 0 R T H E S T A T K 0 p • U T A H 
g H E L T E R m E R m A C 0 R P 0 j v 
Colorado corporation, 
Pi a inf i f l Appk 1 I ahi , 
vs . 
OHIO CASUALTY ., INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an 0n: o corporat: i on, 
Defendant-Cross 
Appe11ant/Respondent 
Case No. 86-0174-CA 
Supreme Court No. 860] 04 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT/RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CALL1STER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER SNOW,
 CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
John A. Beckstead (A0263) Raymond Berry (A0310) 
John H. Rees (A4031) John R. Lund (A4368) 
Suite 800 Attorneys for Cross Appellants/ 
Kennecott Building Respondent Ohio Casualty & 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 Insurance Company 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Attorneys for Appellants Salt Lake City, Utah 84 145 
Shelter America Telephone: (801> R"51 900J 
Corporation 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: INCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES IN 
THE DEFINITION OF "MOTOR VEHICLE" IS A 
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE AND SHOULD NOT BE 
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
POINT II: THE DEFINITION OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES DID NOT INCLUDE MOBILE HOMES 
PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT 
CONCLUSION 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Foil v. Ballinger, 
601 P. 2d 144 (Utah 1979) 2, 3 
Stephens v. Henderson, 
63 Utah Adv. Rpt. 10 (August 13, 1987) . 2 
Thorp Finance Corporation v. Wright, 
16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (1965) . . . 4, 5, 6 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 2 
OTHER 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 687 (5th ed. 1979) 5 
Utah Senate Debate; Second Reading of Senate 
Bill 63; February 9, 
1987, Day 29; 47th Legislature 5 
-ii-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHELTER AMERICA CORPORATION, a 
Colorado corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
OHIO CASUALTY & INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Ohio corporation, 
Defendant-Cross 
Appellant/Respondent. 
Case No. 86-0174-CA 
Supreme Court No. 860104 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT/RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INCLUSION OF MOBILE HOMES IN THE DEFINITION 
OF "MOTOR VEHICLE" IS A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE 
AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY. 
The coverage of Ohio Casualty's motor vehicle dealer's bond 
should be determined by reference to the definition of motor 
vehicle which existed at the time that bond was issued. 
Appellant argues for retroactive application of the amendment 
adding mobile homes. This belies appellant's doubt that the 
earlier definition included mobile homes. Moreover, retro-
active application is plainly inappropriate. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-3 provides that: "No part of these revised is 
retroactive unless expressly so declared." 
Retroactivity was most recently addressed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Stephens v. Henderson, 63 Utah Adv. Rpt. 10 
(August 13, 1987), where the Liability Reform Act was consid-
ered. The court decided that the act, which eliminates joint 
and several liability, should not be applied retroactively 
because it affected substantive rights. "The application of a 
statute is retroactive if it alters the substantive law on 
which the parties rely." _Id. at 10. Ohio Casualty issued its 
bond in reliance on the existing definition of motor vehicle. 
To now expand the scope of that bond and Ohio Casualty's corres-
ponding obligation, would directly affect the substantive 
rights of the parties. As in Stephens, the amendment should 
not be given retroactive effect. 
Appellant's argument that the amendment is simply a clarifi-
cation of existing law begs the question. Furthermore, the 
case cited for applying clarifications retroactively is distin-
guishable from the present case. In Foil v,, Ballinger, 601 
P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), a medical malpractice claimant failed to 
comply with the notice of intent to sue provisions of Utah Code 
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Ann. § 78-14-8. While the action was pending, the legislature 
amended that statute to expressly provide that it did not apply 
to actions arising prior to its effective date nor did it 
determine when an action was commenced for statute of 
limitations purposes. The legislative history made it quite 
clear that the legislature had added this amendment to clarify 
its original intent. The court noted: 
Representative Bangerter, a co-sponsor of the original 
act as well as of the amendment, stated in the House 
of Representatives that a problem as to effectuation 
of legislative intent with respect to the 1976 Act had 
become apparent following an interpretation of the 
Malpractice Act by the courts. He noted that this 
Court had applied the notice requirement retroactively 
and that the amendment was presented for the purpose 
of overturning that decision and making it clear that 
Section 78-14-8 is applicable only to causes of action 
arising after April 1, 1976. 
Id. at 150. Based on this history, the amendment was clearly 
intended to correct and clarify the initial act. No such 
legislative history is present here. 
In Foil, the court further acknowledged the danger of 
applying acts retroactively whether for purposes of clarifi-
cation or otherwise. The court stated: 
We recognize the potential mischief, indeed, the grave 
constitutional problems, that could arise if the 
Legislature were to attempt to determine the outcome 
of a particular case by passage of a law intended to 
accomplish such a purpose. 
Id. at 151. This observation is quite appropriate in the 
present case where appellant has procured an affidavit from a 
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state administrator to the effect that the amendment was sought 
"in response to this type of litigation." Affidavit of Joseph 
C. Fackerell, Jr., 1f 7. If the Motor Vehicle Administration 
considered an amendment to the statute necessary, it was cer-
tainly appropriate to seek that amendment. However, it is 
inappropriate to attempt to enforce such an amendment in a case 
that arose prior to the amendment. 
POINT II 
THE AMENDMENT ADDS MOBILE HOMES WHERE 
THEY WERE NOT INCLUDED BEFORE. 
Contrary to appellant's argument, the amendment including 
mobile homes as motor vehicles does not imply that mobile homes 
were included before the amendment. If mobile homes were 
included before, then there was no need for the amendment. 
Most importantly, appellants have ignored the effect of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Thorp Finance Corporation v. 
Wright, 16 Utah 2d 267, 399 P.2d 206 (1965). 
In Thorp the court interpreted the definition to include as 
motor vehicles only those units for which the primary purpose 
is use on the highways. Id. at 207. This is entirely 
consistent with the definition itself which only includes 
"vehicles(s) intended primarily for use and operation on the 
public highways." Utah Code Ann. § 41-3-7 (before and after 
amendment). Hence, twenty years ago, the Supreme Court 
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concluded that house trailers were not motor vehicles. The 
legislature's recent amendment overrules this decision and the 
rule of law that it created. 
The fact that state agencies have treated mobile homes as 
motor vehicles is of no consequence. These agencies, at least 
the Tax Commission, treated house trailers as motor vehicles 
when Thorp was decided. Id. at 208. That did not affect the 
court's interpretation of the definition. It requires legisla-
tive action, not just historical agency practice, to change the 
law. From the ruling in Thorp until the legislative amendment, 
the law of this state did not include mobile homes within the 
definition of motor vehicles. 
Appellant further suggests that the legislative history of 
the amendment sheds no light on the question presented. This 
is not quite correct. The legislature did indicate that one of 
the objectives of the bill was to broaden the definition of 
automobile dealer. Utah Senate Debate; Second Reading of 
Senate Bill 63; February 9, 1987, Day 29; 47th Legislature. 
Clearly, that objective was met by adding mobile home dealers. 
The fact that the amendment uses the term "including" has 
no bearing. Indeed, the current edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary suggests that "include" can connote an addition as 
well as a clarification. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 
p. 687 (5th ed. 1979), "include" means: 
To confine within, hold as in an enclosure, take in, 
attain, shut up, contain, enclose, comprise, compre-
hend, embrace, involve. Term may, according to 
context, express an enlargement and have the meaning 
of and or in addition to, or merely specify a partic-
ular thing already included within general words there-
fore used. "Including" within statute is interpreted 
as a word of enlargement or illustrative application 
as well as a word of limitation. 
Hence, the use of the term "including mobile homes," is 
entirely consistent with the expressed legislative intent to 
broaden the scope of the statute. 
The suggestion that "including mobile homes" was simply a 
clarification of the statute must be rejected. The statute was 
clarified by the Utah Supreme Court in Thorp Finance 
Corporation v. Wright to not include mobile homes. The prac-
tice of state agencies treating mobile homes as vehicles 
intended primarily for use and operation of the public highways 
was simply contrary to the definition contained in the statute 
before its amendment. This court should not give retroactive 
effect to the effort by those agencies to bring the law into 
conformity with their practices. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons as well as those stated in Ohio Casualty's 
previous briefs, Ohio Casualty's bond should not have been 
construed by the lower court to cover fraud involving mobile 
homes because mobile homes are not motor vehicles as that term 
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was defined by the governing statute. Ohio Casualty respect-
fully requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the lower 
court and rule that Ohio Casualty is not liable to Shelter 
America in any amount. 
DATED this /' day of October, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
/2^ 
M. Berry 
Lund 
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